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It is widely accepted  that investment  in human capital and social services, when accompanied
by growth, remain the primary means to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life.  However,
during the turbulent 1980s  when the majority  of developing  countries faced severe macroeconomic
crises, growth slowed markedly,  to the point where many countries  no longer registered positive per
capita  growth.  In this environment,  living standards  often fell sharply, particularly  among the poor.
Early on, while most of international  institutions  were still focusing  on how the developing  world was
going to reestablish  macroeconomic  balance  and service its external debt, the OECD Development
Centre launched a study of the effects of adjustment  on income  distrib!.ion and poverty.
When the OECD project was launched, little was known about how adjustment  programs
affected ik.come  distribution. To begin with, no economic  crisis like this one had occurred before.
For the first time, policies to alleviate  poverty  had to take into account  the need to stabilize  the
economy  and to promote restructuring  to restore (or establish)  long-run growth through improved
resource allocation. Secornd,  the tools needed  to analyze  the joint effects  of stabilization  and
microeconomic  structural adjustment  policies we-  not yet developed.'
Because  the macroeconomic  crises had pt,-  .sive effects, analyzing  them required an
economywide  approach  that went beyond  the descriptive  approach  used, by Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart
(1987) among others, in their UNICEF study. 2 Most adjustment  programs, whether  they were
supported  by the IMF and the World Bank or not, emphasized  the simultaneous  applicatior of
stabilization  and structural adjustment  measures. Stabilization  policies emphasized  demand
management,  while structural adjustment  programs emphasized  microeconomic  reforms designed  to
have supply-augmenting  effects. Despite  this difference, however, stabilization  and structural
adjustment  measures are not always easy to separate; exchange  rate policies, for example, are a
fundamental  element  of both IMF-supported  stabilization  packages  and Bank-supported  structural2
adjustment  packages. Considering  not only these analytical  issues but also the difficulty  of obtaining
reliable information  on poverty  and income  distritution - especially  before and after adjustment  -
(and the emotionally  charged  nature of the topic of income  distribution), it is understandable  that we
were poorly informed  about the likely distributional  effects of adjustment.
The OECD project was designed  to remedy this situation. A two-pronged  approach was used
that combined country  studies and simulation  analysis. For the country  studies, countries  were
selected  to provide wide geographical  coverage and variation  in initial conditions,  to give a relatively
detailed  picture of the variety of adjustment  experiences. Authors were asked to draw on all available
information  on distributional  shifts and poverty  indicators  during adjustment  in their interpretations  of
events. Country authors were also encouraged  to rely on simulation  methods  and counterfactual
analysis  to compensate  for the general lack of information  on distributional  indicators during
adjustment and to provide a more informed and dispassionate  assessment  of each country's
adjustment  experience. These methods  could also be used to isolate the effects of various policies.
This symposium  brings together a selection  of the country studies commissioned  by the
project.  In this introduction  to the symposium,  we first discuss  the channels  through which the
stabilization/structural  adjustment  programs are likely to have affected  the distribution  of income.
This analytical  discussion  is essential  for understanding  how adjustment  is likely to get translated into
distributional  shifts across households  and how the linkages  between stabilization  and structural
adjustment  policies were modeled in the simulation  analyses. We then discuss  the six country studies
presented in the volume, 3 recalling  in section 3 the initial conditions  and diversity  of disequilibria
facing each country. In section  4, we synthesize  the main conclusions  from the inerpretative
description  in the country studies.  Then in section 5, we turn to the lessons from the simulation
exercises used extensively  in all but one country study (Chile) to evaluate  the effects  of the selected3
adjustment  packages  on povercy  and income  distribution  and to examine  whether alternative  policies
would have been preferable. Conclusions  follow in section  6.
2.  ISSUES  IN THE DESIGN  OF ADJUSTMENT  PROGRAMS  WITH A POVERTY  FOCUS
This section introduces  the issues  that had to be confronted  in the design of adjustment
packages  with demand management  and supply-side  components. Emphasis  is on the tradeoffs faced
and on the role of rigidities  in increasing  distributional  shifts and making  adjustment  both more
difficult  and less sustainable,  because  of resistance  to cuts in living standards. We start with a
discussion  of the tradeoffs between  equity and efficiency,  at one point in time and then
intertemporally,  and close with a discussion  on the selection  of poverty alleviation  methods. This
discussion  also identifies  the information  that would  be needed to comprehensively  evaluate  the long-
run distributional  effects of adjustment  packages. Even though not enough  time has elapsed to
evaluate  the long-run effects of adjustment  packages  on income distribution, the emphasis  on growth
is warranted  because these programs emphasize  supply-side  effects.  Only by focusing  on long-run
growth are we able to see the eventual  tradeoffs  faced by the growth-oriented  packages of the 1980s.
Next, we consider  the short-run adjustment  to the external  shocks  that were at the origin of the crisis,
concentrating  on the role of initial conditions,  rigidities, and tastes in determining  the impact  of
adjustment  on the factoral  distribution  of income. In many ways, short-run tradeoffs  dominated  the
measures  adopted, and much of the discussion  in the remainder  of the paper will deal with
identification  and analysis  of these tradeoffs, since these are the only ones that can be identified  at this
stage.4
(a)  Growth  and distribution  in the long-run: tradeoffs  between efficiency  and equity'
As we argue in more detail below (in 3ect.Un  2b), the difficulty  faced by the majority of
developing  countries  during the 1980s  was how to adjust to a particularly strong external shock that
combined  a deterioration  in the terms of trade with an increase in interest rates on foreign debt and
for many countries, the foreclosing  of access to foreign funds. for  economies  on a normal growth
path with resources at or close to full employment,  adjustment  required a shift in resources toward
the tradables sector. For economies  with idle capacity, adjustment  required, in addition, structural
reforms with supply-augmenting  effects. An efficient  resource transfer towards tradables would result
in a net foreign exchange  savings and would  allow for interest  payments  on the foreign debt, which
could  no longer  be rolled over because of insufficient  foreign financing.
To induce a shift in resources toward the tradables sector, the relative price of tradables had
to rise.  Also, absorption  had to be reduced relative to income. In the absence of access to foreign
borrowing abroad, the easiest way to speed up adjustment  is to increase  the rate of investment  by
increasing  the rate of domestic saving. But since the overal!  ievel of expenditures  also had to be
reduced, such a strategy would  have resulted in a drastic cut in consumption  expenditures, which
would already have fallen because  of income loss resulting  from the external  shock.  Poverty would
certainly  increase. These efforts to achieve  efficient  output levels are likely to conflict  sharply with
efforts to alleviate  poverty during the adjustment  period. 5 We now illustrate the dilemmas  faced
under those circumstances.
As the discussion  of the country  studies will show, the relative importance  attached to equity
and efficiency  in the policymakers'  intertemporal  social objectives  varied:  concern for equity
(increasing  the consumption  of the poorest) weighed  more heavily in, say, Malaysia  and Indonesia
than in Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco which emphasized  increasing  efficiency  (growth in per capita5
consumption)  by reducing macroeconomic  disequilibria. It is therefore useful to begin our discussion
of the tradeoffs faced during adjustment. Redistribute  now or later? If now, at wi it distortionary
cost and through what means  - by transfers or by investment  in the poor?
Consider the simple analytic  representation  in figure 1 of the three tradeoffs  mentioned  above.
The economy is assumed  to consist of two classes of agents: the poor with income  y. and the non-
poor with income yn. Assume  that population  shares (np,  n,,) are constant, so that different levels  of
aggregate  income are represented  by the family of iso-income  lines with constant slope  /n. 1. Now
suppose  that if no policy decision  is taken, adjustment  wil, be distribution-neutral  (i.e., the economy
will move along the ray ON.  (Later we will deal in more detail with the mechanisms  through which
adjustment  itself affects the factoral  distribution  of income.) The economy  is initially  at Al.  The
social indifference  through A, reflects the policymakers'  evaluation  of equity.  Consider now a policy
aimed at reducing poverty  through a transfer of current income  to the poor.  The static tradeoff
between  poverty reduction and efficiency  is represented  by the move  from A, to B,.  At B 1, the
income  of the poor has risen, but the mean income of the population  is lower since the economy  is
now on a lower iso-income  line.  The difference  between the slope of the segment A 1 B, and that of
the lines L represents  the contemporaneous  marginal  efficiency  cost of reducing  poverty, that is both
the leakage  due to imperfect  targeting and the distortionary  cost of transfers.  So long as B, lies on a
higher social indifference  curve than A 1 as in figure 1, current transfers to the poor are preferred to
noninterver..ion.
It is already clear that evaluating  whether adjustment  policies should be accompanied  by an
activist redistributive  policy is going to be difficult. For example, in economies  like Malaysia, where
equity is assigned  a relatively  high weight because  oL  concerns  about racial imbalances,  the social
indifference  curve through A 1 is likely to be steep and so redistributive  policies are likely to be
undertaken. By contrast, in economies  with relatively weak administrative  and fiscal systems, theFigure  1
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segment A, B 1 is likely to be steep, and redistributive  policies will not be undertaken  because of the
need to re!y on highly distortionary  tax policies to effect the current transfer. 6
Consider now the intertempora'  tradeoff. The no-intervention  path leads to A2,  whi!e B 2
represents  the outcome  of having redistributed  current income during period 1.  Here it is assumed
that the redistribution  of current income  leaves the primary distribution  of income in future periods
unaffected. As depictcd here, the dynamic  cost of current transfers is quite large as B 2 is well below
A2.'  (Because  capital transfers involve investments  with a long gestation lag, they were generally  not
among  the strategies considered  during the 1980s, when the key issue was to determine whether
protecting  the current income of the poor was feasible in light of the overriding concern with
maintaining  -- or establishing  -- efficiency  during the crisis. 8)  The  main objective  of the OECD
project was to determine  to what extent the process of adjustment,  which in itself included non-neutral
policias, affected  the distribution  of income. In terms of figure 1, the issue is how much did A 2
deviate  from ON, that is, how much did strategies  that included  a transfer redistribution  component
(B 2) deviate  from ON and what was the cost of redistributive  policies (how much belo  X LA 2 is LB2).
In applying the framework  in figure 1 to individual  countries, initial conditions  are important.
For example, as the discussion  below indicates,  Indonesian  and Malaysian  authorities  placed a
relatively high weight on equity issues in their policy choices. In terms of figure 1, this implies  that
the intertemporal  base run scenarios  in the modeling  exercises would be less steep than the
distribution-neutral  path A,N in figure 1.  Also, to take a specific example, in the Indonesian  case,
dift._ient  combinations  of government current and capital expenditures  yield significantly  different
short- and long-run effects on growth and income  distribution.(b) Adjustment  and distribu'  sn in the short-run: initial conditions,  structure,
and rigidities
Since adjustment  meant that developing  countries  had to transfer more resources abroad to
service their debt, a loss of purchasing  power in terms of tradables was inevitable  and an increase in
poverty was possible. Terms of trade losses also imply a loss in purchasing  power of income in
terms of cradables  for the economy  as a whole. Therefore, to observe that some measure  of the
aggregate  economywide  real wage fell during adjustment  shouid be no surprise.  This is not to say,
however, that all incomes  were affected  proportionately  by adjustment. Indeed, certain distributional
shifts are to be expected  during adjusument.
To illustrate  the tradeoffs  between  equity and efficiency,  it was convenient  to assume that
primary incomes  were unaffected  by current transfers and, by implication,  that adjustment  policies did
not affect the distribution  of income.  While such a simplification  is useful for discussing  poverty-
reduction strategies  in economies  in long-run equilibrium,  it is certainly  not appropriate  for studying
how income  distribution  was affected in the short run by the adjustment  policies that were designed  to
cope with the macroeconomic  crises of the 1980s. 9
Figure 2 i!lustrat s the interaction  between  stabilization  and structural adjustment  policies for
two identical economies  (same  tastes, endowments,  and technology)  but with different initial
conditions. The economies,  labelled  F for flexible and R for rigid, are decomposed  into a tradables
sector T and a nontradables  sector N.  Economy  F is at a full-employment  efficient (undistorted)
production  equilibrium  P  while economy  R is inside  its production  possibility  frontier at PR  because
of distortions  and unemployed  resources.  Both economies  receive a net transfer (or renewable  capital
inflow) from abroad and are therefore able to consume  at Cp and C,  which are beyond their earned
income  by the amount of the (identical)  transfer." 0 Consider now an extemnal  shock resulting in aFigure  2
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higher interest payment on the foreign debt such that both economies  can no longer consume  beyond
their production  possibility  frontier.
Consider first economy  F.  If the relative price of nontradables  remained  unchanged,
consumers  would wish to consume  at C' which is on the same income-consumption  curve
corresponding  to the initial relative price of tradables  pO. However, at this set of relative prices, there
is excess supply of nontradables  (or demand for tradables). If relative prices are flexible, the
economy  will adjust and move to E.  With full price flexibility,  there is only a primary cost of
adjvstment  which involves  bringing real expe litures in line with real income. However, if there is
some relative price rigidity in the system and the real exchange rate cannot adjust, then there will be a
secondary  adjustment  cost.  The line EF traces the locus of intersection  points between income  budget
lines and income-consumption  curves (not drawn), each corresponding  to a different  value of the real
exchange  rate.  Thus, depending  on the extent of relative price rigidity, the economy  will adjust
somewhere  along  EF.  In the extreme case of no relative price flexibility (as would occur, for
example, in a fully indexed economy  where a devaluation  of the exchange  rate would be shortly
followed  by a proportional  increase in prices and wages), the economy  would end up at F, where the
external  constraint is met."t
Consider now economy  R, with initially  unemployed  resources.  If economy  R can pursue
structural adjustment  policies at the same time as it brings expenditures  in line with income, then it
can achieve  the same equilibrium  E, since by assumption  both economies  are identical  in endowments
and tastes. For economy  R, however, because  of reforms that improve the allocation  of resources,
the cost of adjustment  is less than in F and, in the extreme  case, adjustment  might even be welfare
increasing. Of course, in the more likely event of price rigidity, economy  R will end up further
inside its production-possibility  frontier. In the case of no relative price flexibility, the economy  will
end up at point R and will therefore, also experience  a secondary  cost of adjustment.11
It is clear from this discussion, and from Meller's case study of Chile (presented in this
issue), that adjustment  is likely to have involved  secondary  adjustment  costs beyond the income loss
and poverty  increase resulting  from the need to service a higher external  debt.  It is precisely in this
context  that there is a role for government  policy to attempt  to minimize  the secondary  costs of
adjustment  by undertaking  appropriate  structural adjustment  policies to minimize  the social costs of
adjustment  by appropriate  complementary  measures.
We have not yet discussed  how shifting  resources  from nontradables  to tradables is likely to
affect  the distribution  of income. Suppose  that the poor get all their income  from the supply of labor
services  while the rich get all their income from the return to capital. For the time being, we shall
assume that both groups have identical  preferences. We assume  further that tradables are labor
intensive and that capital is sector specific in the short run.  Then, we know that the real incomes  of
the owners of the tradable-sector  capital stock will improve, that of the owners of the capital stock in
the nontradable  sector will decline in absolute  terms, and that owners of labor services  will fall in
between.' 2 In the long-run, we know from the Stolper-Samuelson  theorem that, under the usual
competitive  assumptions,  an adjustment  that involves  an increase in the relative price of tradables  will
shift the distribution  of income in favor of labor because  of the rise in the wage-rental  ratio that
accompanies  the resource shift toward tradables.
But the extent of the income redistribution  depends on the economy's structure. Figure 3
contrasts the same two economies  that have to adjust to a reduction  of capital inflows (which is
equivalent  to an increase in transfers abroad). Consider  again the long-run case, where all factors are
mobile across sectors.  In the right-hand  panel, the curves labelled NN show the locus of points
where there is internal  balance, that is equilibrium  in the nontradable  goods market.  Starting  from a
position  of equilibrium,  where income Y is equal to absorption  A (both shown on the horizontal  axis),
an increase in expenditures  will require an increase in the relative price of nontradable  goods  - a fallFigure 3
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in the value of the real exchange  rate - to eliminate  excess demand  for nontradable  goods.  Similarly,
the FF schedules  show the equilibrium  in the tradable goods  market.  Again, starting from an
equilibrium  position, an increase in absorption  wil! create excess demand for tradable goods which
will be eliminated  by an increase  in the relative price of tradable goods. The left-hand  panel depicts
the relationship  between  the wage-rental  ratio and the relative  price of tradable goods  under the
assumption  that tradables are labor intensive." 3 A move away from the origin implies a
redistribution  of income  toward labor.14
Return now to the comparison  of the two economies. Both have to adjust to the same
reduction in capital inflows (i.e. the same leftward  shift in the FF curve measured  at the initial real
exchange  rate).  Economy F is flexible  compared  to economy  R; small shifts in relative prices will
lead consumption  patterns to shift between  tradables and nontradables. Likewise,  small relative price
shifts will elicit a supply response  because the technology is flexible. By contrast, economy  R is
rigid. All imports are essential intermediates  and capital goods that cannot  be produced domestically,
so there is little scope for substitution  in consumption  toward domestically  produced goods even with
large relative price shifts.  Likewise  tiere are rigidities in the production  structure that make it
difficult  to shift resources from nontradables  to tradables."5  Consequently,  the NN and FF schedules
for economy  F are relatively  flat while those for economy  R are relatively  steep. Also, the factor
price frontier for the flexible  economy  is steeper than for the rigid economy  since the cost structures
are different." 6
Consider now what happens to the distribution  of income  when both economies  have to adjust
to the same reduction in capital flows. In the flexible  economy,  the required real depreciation  is
smal!  and the corresponding  change  in the distribution  of income (W. to W,) is also small.  Economy
R, because of rigidities in consumption  patterns  and production  structures,  has to depreciate its real14
exchange rate much more to achieve  the same  adjustment. This sharper real depreciation  means, in
turn, a larger shift in the distribution  of the income (W. to W').  So economic  structure matters.
The same apparatus  could also be adapted  to show how another form of rigidity - factor price
inflexibility  - affects the short-run factoral  distribution  of income resulting from adjustment. It has
often been observed that certain  groups fiercely  resist any adjustment  that requires a cut in their living
standards. For example,  labor in the industrial  sector of many Latin American economies  is
organized in powerful labor unions that resist any drop in real wages. Owners of capital also often
resist any fall in profit margins. Where trade and industrial  policies shield  them sufficiently  from
competitive  pressures abroad and at home, they rely on markup  pricing, which allows them to pass
any cost increases  through to consumers.'"
So far, we have assumed  that both groups have identical  tastes.  Now suppose  that we are
looking at adjustment  in a net food-importing  country (like Morocco) and that workers  have a strong
preference  for tradables.  As figure 4 shows, adjustment  that entails a depreciation  of the real
exchange  rate from eo  to el will lower the real income of workers and raise that of capitalists. Real
income  shifts like this that are due to differences  in tastes are likely to be quite important  for some
low-income  groups, whose expenditures  are mostly on essential  goods like food.  For example,
adjustment  in Chile had a significant  redistributive  effect because it changed  the purchasing  power of
real incomes.' 8
We have  seen  that  how  adjustment  policies  affect  the short-run  factoral  distribution  of income
from the supply  side  depends  on the combination  of initial  conditions  reflected  in the state  of
disequilibrium  in the economy,  the extent  of rigidity  in production  and  demand  structures,  and  the
institutional  characteristics  of the economy  reflected  in the determination  of wage  rates  and  prices.
We  have  also  seen  that differences  in preferences  across  socioeconomic  groups  imply  that changes  in
relative  prices  resulting  from  stabilization  and  structural  reform  policies  will  have  a differential  effectFigure 4
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on real incomes. For these reasons, an economywide  model with a sufficient  level of disaggregation
across sectors, factors of production,  and households  was developed  and applied in the country studies
of the OECD project.
The simulation  models, explained  in greater detail in the companion  paper by Bourguignon,
de Melo, and Suwa (1991) in this symposium,  are of the open-economy  variety described graphically
above. The models  have several sectors, distinguished  by their degree of tradablity, and incorporate
input-output  linkages  to better account for the net factoral intensity  across sectors.  Several types of
labor with partial mobility across sectors and different wage-determination  rules accommodate  real
wage rigidity and labor market segmentation. Factor incomes  are mapped  into households,  which
receive their incomes  from several sources. Households  have different expenditure  patterns to
account for the effects of adjustment  on the purchasing  power of real incomes. The models also
include a government  sector with current and capital expenditures  and a financial  sector that integrates
portfolio choice  by households  and firms. These extensions  of the basic framework  presented  here
enable  the models  to trace the short-to-medium  run effects of adjustment  policies on income
distribution  across households."'
3.  THE CASE STUDIES: A DIVERSITY  OF INITIAL  CONDITIONS  AND SHOCKS
The country studies reveal a remarkable  diversity in the patterns  of adjustment. While all six
countries  had to retrench and adjust in the sense of bringing  expenditure  in line with income, two of
them - Indonesia  and Malaysia  - continued  to make progress  on the distributional  and poverty fronts,
albeit at a slower pace than previously. And for two other countries in the group - CMte  d'Ivoire and
Ecuador - the verdict on adjustment  was not yet in at the end of the period covered in the studies.
Before  presenting a comparative  evaluation  of the adjustment  experience  across this heterogeneous17
group, we briefly describe  the sample (see Table 1) in terms of the origins of the crisis, country-
specific characteristics,  main adjustment  policies, and trends in poverty indicators  during adjustment
(which is discussed  in detail below in section  4).  Of course, the changes in the poverty and
distributional  indicators  described in Table 1 are not necessarily  attributable  to the adjustment  policies
pursued. This will be alluded  to in section  4 and dealt with in greater detail in section 5, which
reports on the results of counterfactual  simulations.
Although external  shocks  were by no means  the only cause of the crisis, all countries  f  . 1
into the dependent-economy  framework  used in section 2.  In our sample, two economies,  Ecuador
and Indonesia, are primarily  natural-resource-based  economies,  with oil exports accounting  for well
over two-thirds of foreign exchange  revenues  at the time of the crisis.  And three economies  -
Ecuador, Cote d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent, Morocco  - can be characterized  as having relatively
rigid demand and supply structures.'
While falling terms of trade and rising interest rates were the main external  causes of crisis in
the countries in our sample, there were other interdependent  causes as well, as the country studies
show.  Except in Chile and Indonesia,  fiscal deficits exceeded  5 percent of GDP, in part because  of
the high interest payments  on the external  debt.  Perhaps the leading proximate  cause of the crisis was
the optimistic  outlook  of all the countries  in our sample following  the short-lived  boom in commodity
prices in the second half of the seventies  (phosphates  for Morocco in 1974; coffee and cocoa for COte
d'Ivoire in 1976; rubber and tin for Malaysia  in 1979; oil for Ecuador, Indonesia, and to a lesser
extent, Malaysia in 1979; and a foreign capital inflow boom for Chile in 1980-81).  21
At the same time as the commodity  boom, the recycling  of petrodollars  in financial markets
provided these countries with access  to private sources of finance at negative  real borrowing costs.
Governments' spending  rose, made easier by the fact that the main source of foreign exchange
earnings  was usually controlled  by public sector companies  or, as in the case of C6te d'Ivoire, by aTabl  I  COUy  dlom  Shoh,  a_uOez,  sd  disturlbu  nl  indcaton
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commodity  stabilization  fund that reaped  the windfall  profits from high coffee and cocoa prices in
world markets. Except in Indonesia  and Malaysia,  the large-scale  public investment  projects
undertaken  during this period were often found  to have low rates of return once the crisis raised
substantially  the opportunity  cost of funds borrowed  on commercial  terms.  The projects also proved
difficult  to scale down.
Another common  pattern in the countries  in our sample  was a large appreciation  of the real
exchange  rate in the years immediately  preceding  the crisis.  (his  is, of course, predicted  by the
model presented in section 2.)  In Chile and Malaysia,  where this appreciation  was particularly acute,
the sense of euphoria was strong and led to a boom in private sector purchases  of imported consumer
durables. Other countries also experienced  some appreciation  of the real exchange  rate, as a portion
of the increased  government  expenditures  fell on nontradables.
Despite these common  patterns, however, the timing and severity of the crisis varied across
the sample, and the need to adjust was determined  by several different factors. For example, the
need to adjust came later for the oil-exporting  economies  in our sample, as the price of oil tumbled in
1986. Chile benefitted  from a sharp increase in the price of copper toward the end of its adjustment
period.  Another important  factor during adjustment  was the degree of access  to foreign financing.
Adverse movements  in the terms of trade were not the only factor behind the crisis for the
two Latin American  economies  in our sample. For Ecuador, perhaps the most significant  factor
during the adjustment  period was its loss of access  to foreign borrowing  just when it was needed most
--  a decade of import-substitution-led  growth  had resulted in a relatively rigid economy. In Chile,
faulty macroeconomic  management  was largely to blame for the crisis.  The combination  of a fixed
exchange  rate, wage indexation  in the formal sector, and an open capital  account (and a ratw  of
inflation  three times that of its major trading partners)  led to capital inflows and a sharp loss of
competitiveness  on external markets. When  the crisis came with the halt in private foreign capital20
inflows, Chile, like Ecuador, had little access  to foreign credit to smooth the adjustment. Unlike
Ecuador, however, Chile was in fiscal surplus  when the crisis began in the fall of 1982.
In the two Asian economies,  the fall in the prices of oil and other primary commodities
brought on the crisis.  In both Indonesia  and Malaysia,  expenditures  would eventually  have to be
brought in line with incomes, and Malaysia  needed to prune a huge public sector deficit (over 20
percent of GDP). But both countries  adjusted  fairly early, and both continued  to have access to
private foreign credit and so did not require recourse to the IMF.  These relatively  favorable
circumstances  are at least partly accountable  for the dramatically  better performance  of the two Asian
economies  on the distributional  front during adjustment.
In Morocco, as the price of phosphates  slumped  in 1976, the government  was unable to trim
its investment  expenditures,  which had tripled during the phosphate  boom that began in 1974, and
stabilization  attempts  failed in 1978  and 1981. A halt to expansionist  policies was finally brought
about with the comprehensive  adjustment  program  of 1983. Morocco, like Chile, Ecuador, and Cote
d'Ivoire had a high external  debt burden when adjustment  started.
Turning next to the stabilization  and structural adjustment  packages, we find that the sample
countries introduced  similar measures  to reduce aggregate  demand: cuts in public expenditures  and
devaluation  (accompanied  by a more restrictive  monetary policy). Structural adjustment  involved
deregulation  of internal  marfrets  and foreign trade liberalization. The cuts in public expenditures  fell
disproportionately  on capital expenditures  because, as explained  in the discussion  of figure 1, current
expenditures  can provide immediate  poverty relief whereas capital expenditures  provide  only future
benefits.  Adjustment  through cuts in capital expenditures  was also politically  easier since construction
workers  have less political power than bureaucrats,  who are likely to resist to a cut in their salaries.
Not surprisingly, public capital expenditures  fell drastically  - by over 50 percent in COte  d'Ivoire,21
Ecuador, and Morocco. Indonesia  and Malaysia,  with less need to adjust, more flexible economies,
and better access to foreign financing, only had to cut public capital expenditures  by about 10 percent.
The other major cutback in public expenditures  was in subsidies,  often on commodities  that
were important  consumption  items for the poor.  Chile, Morocco, and COte  d'Ivoire raised tariff rates
on public sector services (e.g., energy and transport) in an effort to reduce the losses of public
enterprises. But unless efficiency  was improved  at the same time, as was apparently  the case in
Chile, the distributive  effect of these measures  is likely to have been regressive. The distributive
effect of the reductions  in food subsidies  is more complex  to evaluate,  since it depends on supply and
demand elasticities  and on subsidy leakages  to the non-poor. For examnple,  in Morocco only 16
percent of food subsidy  expenditures  reached  the poorest 30 percent of the population  (Mateus, 1983).
A reduction in food subsidies  could actually  reduce inequality  in some cases when accompanied  by
decontrol of food and other prices. By improving  the incentives  for food production, such policies
can boost rural incomes, which are generally  lower than urban incomes,  thereby reducing
inequality.'
The centerpiece  of the structural adjustment  programs was a sharp devaluation  of the
exchange  rate, which was intended  to reduce the macroeconomic  imbalance  resulting from the large
current account deficits and to move resources  toward tradables. With the exception  of CBte  d'lvoire,
the countries in our sample managed  to effect a real devaluation  of the exchange  rate and thereby to
change  production  incentives  toward tradables (see Table 2 below).'
The other main components  of the adjustment  package in countries  that received IMF-World
Bank support were structural reforms that aimed at deregulating  internal  markets  and foreign trade.
Price controls were removed  to a large extent in Ecuador, Morocco, and COte  d'Ivoire.  Trade
liberalization  measures, including  the removal of export taxes on traditional  exports, reduction or
outright abolishment  of quantitative  import restrictions, and a reduction in the level of protection,22
were a particularly important  component  of adjustment  in the economies  with the most distorted
system of incentives: Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Morocco, and Indonesia. No structural reform
measures  were needed in Chile, which had carried out structural adjustment  reforms during the
second half of the 1970s,  or in Malaysia,  which was already open to foreign trade.  Rationalization  of
the fiscal system also figured prominently  in the Moroccan  and Indonesian  reforms.  Besides
introducing  a value added  tax, fiscal reform was directed at broadening  the tax base by reducing  the
number  of exemptions  and narrowing  the tax rates to reduce incentives  to avoid taxes or to arbitrage
across tax categories.2A
To get a sense of the representativeness  of our sample, we compared  the evolution  of key
macro indicators by subperiod  for each country  with corresponding  averages  for appropriate
subsamples  from a large sample of over eighty other developing countries  (Table 2):  primary
exporters  (CCte  d'Ivoire and Morocco), manufacturing  exporters  (Chile and Malaysia), and fuel
exporters  (Ecuador, Indonesia).'  The indicators  as GDP growth; the investment  share in GDP, a
measure  of the sustainability  of adjustment;  the real exchange  rate, here a measure of competitiveness;
and external debt indicators. Period averages  are supposed  to be representative  of the immediate  pre-
crisis (1978-81)  and post-crisis (1982-85)  periods and of the end of the adjustment  period (1986-88),
except for fuel exporters  which had a second shock in 1986. While the period averages do not
always correspond  to the significant  episodes  for the six countries in our sample, the period averages
do correspond broadly  to the periods when the main external environment  changes  of the 1980s
occurred.
The stylized facts that emerge from the period averages  for the country groupings  are broadly
consistent  with the analytical  discussion  in section  2.  Three facts stand out.  One is that only
manufacturing  exporters  have resumed  growth at pre-crisis levels (mostly  the East Asian countries).
Although  the debt-service  burden of this group is high (partly because  of a few Latin American23
countries in the grouping), it has stabilized. Growth  among  the fuel exporters  has deteriorated
throughout  the three periods.  Primary exporters  have recuperated  most of their loss in growth, but
they have not arrested the deterioration  in their external  debt indicators. These differences  in growth
patterns are consistent  with the timing and size of shocks and with the greater ease of adjustment  for
manufacturing  exporters because  of their more flexible  economic  structures.
The second significant  fact is the universal, and pronounced,  decline in the investment  share
in GDP.  For the non-fuel-exporting  groups, the share has fallen by about 20 percent; for fuel
exporters, the decline was an even sharper 30 percent. While it is true that overambitious  investment
programs needed  to be scaled down, these  declines are high enough,  to cause concern  about the
prospects for sustained  recovery. They also suggest  the difficulty  of cutting current expenditure
during a crisis.
The third significant  finding is the sharp real depreciation  of the exchange rate.  Six years into
the crisis, the real exchange had depreciated  by close to 40 percent for all three country
classifications. Without it, the required shift toward tradable  activities needed  to increase the net
transfer from debtor to creditor would not have materialized.
Compared  to the averages  for their corresponding  groups, the countries in this study were
doing better than average in the pre-crisis period  but -- except for Morocco - were harder hit by the
crisis, experiencing  relatively  larger declines in growth rates during 1982-85. Recovery, however,
was also stronger in our small sample of countries. Except for CBte  d'Ivoire and Morocco, which
have high end-of-period  debt indicators,  the countries in our sample were showing  stronger than
average signs  of sustained recovery, although  adjustment  is far from over for two in our sample  of six
countries.Table  2.  Moeconnomic inditors dirning  adjustment  A comparison  with  other  countries,
period averagts  for 197841, 198W5,  and 198648
Debt/GDP CountiylGNP  per capita  GDP gowth  Inveatment/GDP  Rcal exchange ae  (debt-service  raio,  %)
197841  1982-85  1986-88  1978-81  1982-85  1986-88  1978-8  1982-85  198688  1978I  1982-85  1986-88
Cte  d'lvoire  (S1,180t  3.9  0.2  0.5  28.0  16.8  12.9  1.05  1.23  1.10  0.47  1.01  1.14
(24)  (40)  (44)
Morocco (S930)  2.3  3.9  3.9  23.7  22.2  20.3  1.00  1.15  1.25  0.50  0.93  1.10
(35)  (38)  (36)
Primary expouten (45 countries)  2.8  1.4  2.4  21.4  18.4  17.2  1.03  1.13  1.39  0.35  0.53  0.61
_  _  (15)  (20)  (29)
Chile ($2,100)  7.5  -1.5  6.3  19.8  12.1  16.2  1.01  1.12  1.61  0.37  0.83  0.93
(46)  (51)  (29)  4
Malaysia  ($1,690)  7.6  4.8  4.6  30.3  34.1  25.7  0.95  0.86  1.01  0.23  0.49  0.65
MsnuGletunag  cxpolten  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(8)  (15)  (18) Manufacturing  exporters
(23 countris)  4.8  2.4  4.9  26.2  23.5  21.8  1.03  1.12  1.39  0.21  0.35  0.40
Ecuador  ($1,260)  5.2  1.7  2.0  25.8  19.6  21.8  0.96  0 Jl  i.43  0.38  0.57  0.81
(35)  (40)  (33)
Indonesia  ($470)  7.3  2.9  4.0  26.1  27.2  24.1  0.92  1.00  1.52  0.26  0.30  0.58
(18)  (20)  (36)
Fuel expozters  (15 countics)  6.6  2.0  0.9  27.9  24.9  19.4  1.0  0.95  1.35  0.34  0.44  0.63
_________  ._______  (18)  (25)  (39)
Note:  AUl  data are unweighted  period averages.  For definition  of country groupings  see tabk 1.  Sample  of 83 countries  with population  cxceeding I milion in 1980.
a.  Thc real  xchage  rate index is the ratio (expressed  in common currency units) of a weighted  sum of trading patemns'  wholse  price indexes  ovcr the domestic  consumer  price
index (1980 =  1.00). An increase in the value of the index indicates  a deprction  (increased  competiiveness).
b.  In 1980 U.S. dol"an.
Sjou:  For comparator  rigures, Faini and de Melo (1990).25
4.  DISTRIBUTIONAL  OUTCOMES  OF ADJUSTMENT: A SYNTHESIS
What were the distributional  consequences  of adjustment  in the six countries  in our sample?
We have already seen that, while  the countries  shared common  targets during adjustment  - closing
the expenditure-income  gap that had developed  before and during the crisis - initial conditions  and
characteristics  were different. There are many ways in which we could compare results for our
sample countries. We could compare the experience  of Indonesia  and Malaysia,  the only two
countries  that adjusted  without  recourse  to IMF and World Bank stabilization  and structural
adjustment  loans.  Or we could synthesize  the distributional  experience  of our sample  by examining
successively  how each country  performed in terms of distributional  indicators: wages, primary
incomes,  poverty, and income  distribution. What we have chosen to do, however, is to rely on three
pairwise  comparisons: Chile and Malaysia, classified  as manufacturing  exporters  because of the
relatively  larger share of their industrial sectors and the role of manufactured  exports and the two
most open economies  at the time of the crisis; C6te d'lvoire and Morocco, primary product exporters
already on the edge of crisis even before the debt crisis (Morocco  had several failed stabilization
experiences  before embarking  on adjustment  programs);  and Ecuador and Indonesia,  the two oil
exporters.
Chile and Malaysia. The two economies  are clearly the most outward oriented in the sample
and are certainly  among  the developing  countries  with the least government  intervention  in goods and
factor markets. They experienced  the least prolonged  shocks, and much  of their need to adjust was
self-generated. As described  by Meller and by Demery and Demery in their country  studies, both
countries followed  policies ihat led to a sharp real appreciation  of the exchange  rate.  In while, the
appreciation  occurred because  the government  used the exchange  rate to bring down inflation  while
the capital market was open.  Inflows  of short-term  private capital fueled a private expenditure  surge26
that was accompanied  by appreciation  of the real exchange  rate.  In Malaysia, a classic primary
commodity  boom in 1979 was naturally  followed  by real exchange  rate appreciation. But when the
terms of trade moved  against them, with a resulting 7 percent loss in the purchasing  power of income
in 1981  and another 4 percent loss in 1982, the exchange  rate was not allowed to depreciate  as was
required. What both economies  needed  to do was to bring expenditure  in line with income: in Chile,
because  foreign capital inflows  were no longer available  to finance private sector consumption
expenditures,  and in Malaysia,  because fiscal expansion  was no longer consistent  with the new terms
of trade.  Unlike while the other countries  in our sample, Chile and Malaysia  did not require
structural adjustment  policies.
Of course, matters were somewhat  more complicated  than that.  Chileans  had incurred large
dollar-denominated  debts when they were cheap compared  to peso-denominated  loans.  Then, as
Meller points out, when the recession  and devaluation  threw the financial  system into chaos (with bad
loans accounting  for 350 percent of commercial  bank equity), the government  subsidized  holders of
dollar liabilities  through debt-dedollarization  and preferential exchange  rates.  As Meller eloquently
puts it:  'While 600,000 unemployed  workers were receiving 1.5 percent of GDP as unemployment
subsidy, fewer than 2,000 dollar debtors were receiving  subsidies  totaling  3 percent of GDP."
Although  slightly different from the often-mentioned  "Latin American  capital flight" syndrome  -
since the increased indebtedness  was the result of a consumption  boom (mostly  of imported consumer
durables)  - the Chilean crisis shows clearly  that macroeconomic  disequilibrium  has the potential  to
adversely  affect the distribution  of income.
The role of flexibility, which was emphasized  in the discussion  of adjustment  in Figure 2, is
also highlighted  by the contrasting  experience  of Chile and Malaysia. In Chile, adjustment  occurred
through the labor market, with a sharp increase in unemployment  exacerbated  by widespread  wage
indexation  - effective  unemployment  reached 31 percent at the peak of the crisis.3' Thus, whereas27
Malaysia  adjusted  by staying  on, or close to, its production  possibility  frontier, Chile adjusted  by
moving inside it (see figure 2).  During the first of the two post-crisis  periods (1982-5)  shown in table
2, Chile is the only economy  with negative  growth. What were the distributional  consequences  of
this type of adjustment?
Household  surveys show that it was essentially  the heads of households  of the lowest income
quintile  that bore the brunt of unemployment: in that group, 25 percent were unemployed,  compared
to 9 percent in the lower-middle-income  quintile  and 2 percent in the highest-income  quintile.  Also,
unemployment  hurt the lower-income  groups  the most because  they had fewer income  earners per
family.  While household  surveys were not available  for the other counties, so we cannot draw
comparisons,  it is unlikely that this pattern of adjustment  would have been observed in other countries
where the crisis mostly led to underemployment  among  the poor in the informal sector.
Another interesting  piece of evidence  from the Chilean adjustment  episode is the impact  of the
real exchange  rate depreciation  on the purchasing  power of real incomes. As pointed out in figure 4,
if households  have consumption  patterns that differ in their tradable goods intensity, a depreciation  of
the real exchange  rate will have a redistributive  effect through the consumption  side.  The evidence
(see Meller, table 6) suggests  that this effect was quite significant  because  of the large change  in the
value of the real exchange  rate during adjustment: the middle 40 percent income group lost about 4
percent less real income through the real exchange  rate devaluation  than the lower 40 percent income
group.
In contrast, Malaysia  adjusted  with very little secondary  adjustment  costs during 1984-87  -
private consumption  fell by 8.4 percent in real terms and investment  by about one third. But there
were two fundamental  differences  in initial conditions  compared  to Chile:  Malaysia's investment  rate
was much higher and its initial indebtedness  was less (see Table 2).  Both factors undoubtedly  helped
the Malaysian  government  to secure external  funding at a time when other developing  countries were28
being denied access  to foreign financing. Malaysia  adjusted  more through expenditure  switching  than
through expenditure  reduction.
Adjustment  was not accompanied  by any significant  distributional  shifts in Malaysia. In fact,
even though progress in reducing inequality  - a hallmark of Malaysian  policy since it launched its
"growth  with redistribution"  strategy in 1971  - stopped  temporarily, social expenditures  grew in real
terms during adjustment. In sum, because Malaysia  entered into adjustment  from an economy  that
had been growing  rapidly, it was relatively easy to reduce expenditures  and even though investment
had to be cut, high investment  levels by international  standards  were maintained  during adjustment.
Another interesting  comparison  between  the two countries relates to issues of political
economy  and the sustainability  of adjustment. Chile was able to continue  much of its difficult
expenditure  reduction  through to the end in large part because  of the political situation resulting  from
the military dictatorship. Malaysia, was able to carryout a sustainable  adjustment  program under a
democracy  without social  unrest, probably  because equity considerations  had been a prominent  social
welfare concern for over a decade. This said, it should also be noted  that Chile, despite a worsening
income distribution,  managed  a very successful  targeted program  of assistance  during adjustment  that
undeniably  helped the very poorest.  Also, infant  mortality continued  to fall during adjustment,
reaching one of the lowest levels (8 per 1,000) among  middle-income  countries.
CBte  d'Ivoire and Morocco. During the 1970s,  CMte  d'Ivoire and Morocco, like many  other
exporters  of primary commodities,  experienced  a short-lived  commodity  boom that they treated as
though it were permanent. In CBte  d'Ivoire, the receipts of the commodity  stabilization  fund went up
tenfold with the coffee and cocoa  boom.  These funds, which were supposed  to be put aside for
coffee and cocoa producers  during periods of low prices, were spent on infrastructure  construction
projects - projected  with long gestation lags and no prospects for earning foreign exchange  earnings.
In Morocco, they used the windfall  revenue gains from the tripling of the phosphate  price in 1974  to29
finance a large public investment  program, to raise government  salaries, and to provide food
subsidies. When commodity  prices slumped  in 1976 and 1977, both countries  resorted to foreign
borrowing. Not surprisingly, both countries  had higher than average debt burden indicators  in the
period before the crisis (see 1977-81  period averages  in Table 2) and a level of indebtedness  that left
them with little room to maneuver  when the debt crisis occurred in 1981-82.
External crisis struck both countries  earlier than the other countries in our sample. Morocco
also postponed adjustment  longer  than any other country. Special  circumstances  accounted  for this
postponement. Thanks to continued  access to external  borrowing, especially  from Saudi Arabia,
Morocco was able to postpone  adjustment.  COte  d'Ivoire, as a metnber of the CFA zone, had
access  to the French treasury for extemal funds.  Indeed, the relative indebtedness  (vis-a-vis  group
averages)  of both countries increased  throughout  the adjustment  period.'
In contrast to Chile and Malaysia,  COte  d'Ivoire and Morocco  had relatively interventionist
policies  - price controls, high and dispersed  tariff structures  complemented  by quantitative
restrictions  - and relatively weak fiscal administrations. In terms of Figure 2, both economies  were
inside  their respective  production  possibility  frontiers  and in need of microeconomic  structural
adjustment  measures. CBte  d'lvoire implemented  such measures  in the adjustment  programs of 1981-
83 and 1984-86  (see the article in this issue by Lambert, Schneider, and Suwa, Table 2 for a
description);  in Morocco, in 1983-85  (see Morrisson, Table 1 for a description). Measures in both
countries  were aimed at closing  the fiscal expenditure-receipt  gap and improving  the efficiency  of
resource allocation  by rationalizing  domestic  and foreign  trade tax structures  and by removing  price
controls and quantitative  restrictions  on imports. Morocco also relaxed interest rate controls  and tried
to induce  the repatriation  of workers' remittances  from abroad  by providing  preferential interest rates.
Morocco is the only country  in the sample whose  growth rate rose during adjustment,  while
CBte  d'Ivoire is the only one that showed  no sign of improvement  until the end.  Two factors account30
for this difference  in performance  despite  relatively  similar adjustment  packages. First, the weather
favored Morocco (good rainfalls in 1985  and 1986)  and plagued  CBte  d'Ivoire (drought in 1983).
How important  were weather conditions? For Morocco, the agricultural  sector benefitted  greatly
from the exceptionally  good rainfalls  of 1985-86,  although  liberalization  of agricultural  markets also
helped and the devaluation  stimulated  a growth in export crops.  During those two years, agriculture
is estimated  to have contributed  about half of the increase in economic  growth. The growth in
agricultural export crops raised the income of farmers since the supply increases  were not generally
accompanied  by a fall in real prices.  Morrisson  (see article in this issue) concludes  that primary
incomes in agriculture  fared well, and that this helped reduce income inequality  between rmral  and
urban incomes. For C6te d'Ivoire, simulations  suggest  that the drought reduced GDP growth by
more than 8 percent after 1983, at the same time increasing  the agricultural  terms of trade by more
than 10 percent.
Second, Cote d'Ivoire had less room to maneuver because  it could not explicitly  use the
exchange  rate as a switching  device. Indeed, by the end of the period, the amount of expenditure
switching  through real exchange  rate devaluation  was lower in Cote d'Ivoire than in any other country
in the sample (see Table 2 and comparator  figures). Furthermore, because  of its weak administrative
capability,  Cote d'Ivoire failed in its efforts to reduce the deficit  via tax increases  and to compensate
for an inability  to devalue its currency  through an equivalent  commercial  policy of uniform tariffs and
export subsidies.
In both Morocco and Cote d'lvoire, the brunt of adjustment  was borne by city dwellers. The
combination  of reforms and tavorable  weather  in Morocco  helped reduce rural unemployment,  but in
the towns, employment  did not grow fast enough to absorb new entrants in the labor force, and urban
unemployment  rose 3 percentage  points, reaching 15 percent, despite a respectable  3.8 percent a year
growth in employment. At the same time, because  the supply  of skilled labor was growing much31
faster than demand (due largely to education  policies of the previous decade), there was a sharp drop
in the real wage of skilled labor. These factors,  together with the removal of quantitative  restrictions
whose quota rents had gone to wealthier  Moroccans,  helped to reduce income inequality.
Much the sane  pattern developed  in Cote d'Ivoire with the brunt of adjustment  falling on
urban workers who lost their jobs in the private and parastatal  sectors.  If one assumes that the
unemployed  urban workers received  some support from those that kept their jobs, then the per capita
incomes  or urlian workers fell the most.  On the other hand, government  employees  (the better-off
socioeconomic  group) managed  to retain their jobs although  their real wages fell.  In rural areas, the
little evidence  available  from household  surveys  suggests  an increase in per capita expenditures  for
non-food items. Lambert, Schneider,  and Suwa also suggest that the inicrease  in food prices relative
to nonagricultural  products must have helped sustain rural income levels.
T'hus  both countries managed  to reduce the rural-urban  income gap during adjustment,  largely
by improving  agricultural  incentives. Adjustment  measures  contributed  in two ways:  devaluation  of
the real exchange  rate, which stimulated  agricultural  exports, a particularly significant  effect in
Morocco, and liberalization  of agricultural  markets  - reduction  of price controls  on food, reduction
of taxation  of agricultural exports, the abolishment  of public monopolies  in fertilizers and agricultural
exports in Morocco, and the commercialization  of rice in Cote d'Ivoire.9
Unfortunately,  these positive effects  of adjustment  on supply and on the rural-urban primary
income  gap were not matched  by trends in social expenditures,  especially  in COte  d'Ivoire, which had
to rely heavily on cuts in public expenditures. In C6te d'Ivoire, per capita expenditures  on education
fell, and primary school enrollment  grew slower than primary school population. Not only social
expenditures,  but transfers to the poor were cut as well, including  subsidies  on items that constituted  a
significant  proportion  of the consumption  of the poor, such as rice, electricity, water.  Morocco  also32
cut education  expenditures,  but the effects were alleviated  by rising school enrollments. And
Morocco maintained  its food subsidies.
Ecuador and Indonesia. Ecuador and Indonesia  are more a study in contrasts  than in
similarities  since they have little in common  in their adjustment  experience  except the need to adjust
to a fall in oil revenues. Indonesia  carried out its adjustment  program without  asking for support
from international  institutions,  suggesting  strong internal  political support for adjustment.Y Like
Malaysia,  Indonesia  also benefitted  from a relatively  light debt burden when the crisis occurred (see
Table 2), due largely to the constitutional  requirement  for a balanced  budget.  Its continued access  to
foreign financing  helped cushion  the adjustment. Investment  in  Indonesia  was al;  o considerably
stronger than the average for fuel exporters.  By contrast, Ecuador had recourse  to support from the
intemational  organizations  and in a broad sense did not "own" its adjustment  program, and so had
difficulty  getting the support needed  to carry out its structural reforms.  Nor did Ecuadofr  have access
to external  financing when it was most needed. These problems  notwithstanding,  both Ecuador and
Indonesia  did much  better than other fuel exporters  (Table 2), resuming  growth in the last period and
cutting back less on investment  expenditures.
Indonesia  not only achieved  stabilization  but also carried out structural reforms that helped  to
increase credibility  of its adjustment  program. In particular, financial  sector reforms leading to
convertibility  of the rupiah inspired  confidence  in the expenditure-switching  and-reducing  measures
that were being implemented  concurrently. Much like Malaysia,  Indonesia  began its adjus,ment  from
a position  of high growth and high investment. What is remarkable  is that while Indonesia  w;3
undergoing  structural adjustments  that reduced its dependence  on exports of nonrenewable  resources
for foreign exchange earnings  and government  revenues  and improved  the efficiency  of resource
allocation and investments  (see the article by Thorbecke in this issue), the country was also reducing
poverty and undernutrition.  Data from household  surveys  suggest a much lower incidence  of poverty33
in 1987 than in 1984 in both rural and urban areas, with the proportion  of the population  below the
poverty  line falling from 33 percent in 1984  to slightly over 20 percent in 1987. But the impact  of
favorable initial conditions  must not be overlooked. Thorbecke  points out that several measures
already underway in the pre-adjustment  period helped Indonesia  maintain  the momentum  of its
poverty  alleviation  policies  during the adjustment  period - investment  in rural infrastructure,  the
fertilizer subsidy, and other measures  that contributed  to the rice boom and the process of agricultural
adjustment. It also appears that these improvements  did not come at the expense  of capital
expenditures  in social services  in the first years of the adjustment  program, although  beginning in
1986, capital expenditures  (construction  of schools, hospitals, clinics and dispensaries)  were cut
drastically.
In Ecuador, implementation  of the stabilization  and adjustment  program was hampered by the
strongly divergent interests of agroexporters  on the coast and government  bureaucrats in the
capital.3  These conflicts  led to half-hearted  implementation  of difficult  measures  to reduce the fiscal
imbalance  and weakened  the credibility  of the adjustment  program. Despite initial successes  in 1984
and 1985, the austerity measures  could not be maintained  in 1986, when the price of oil fell again.
To sustain the faltering  alliance between  economic  elites and lower-class  urban groups, the
government  turned to populism  and regionalism,  compromising  its austerity measures  with a large
public works program. An earthquake  hit the country in March 1987, damaging  an oil pipeline  and
reducing  oil output by about one-third. With no external  funding available, it should come as no
surprise that there was little internal  support for the adjustment  measures  and that capital flight was
extensive.
Although  not much information  is available  on distributional  trends in Ecuador, there is little
doubt that poverty increased substantially;  it is likely as well that income distribution  worsened
towards the end of the adjustment  period since capital flight benefitted  the upper classes. During34
1981-85,  as part of its fiscal austerity measures,  the government  had to sharply reduce education  and
health benefits. The share of value-added  accruing  to labor fell by over 8 percent per year during
1980-86. The decline in living standards  was particularly  acute in urban areas: unemployment  (and
underemployment)  for Quito was estimated  at over 20 percent for 0987, and the real wage was 53
percent lower in 1989 than in 1980. Industrial  employment  had to fall once adjustment  became
inevitable  because  previous rapid employment  growth in the sector had been fueled  by high levels of
protection."
Since data on household  incomes  were unavailable  for Ecuador, de Janvry, Sadoulet  and
Fargeix estimated  household-specific  income  equations  that allowed them to predict changes in real
per capita incomes. They conclude  that the boom period had a progressive  effect on income
distribution  in agriculture  and a neutral effect in the urban sector and that the crisis had a regressive
effect in both sectors.  They also concluded  that the educated  urban population  lost the most in per
capita terms during adjustment  (about two-thirds  during 1980-87). These estimates,  however, do not
take into account  the potential  gains from asset protection  through capital flight.
5.  LESSONS  FROM THE COUNTERFACTUAL  SIMULATIONS
In this section, we draw lessons  from the model-based  exercises  in three areas:  completing
the picture where information  is lacking, especially  on the magnitude  of real income loss in the
informal  sector; estimating  the relative effects of alternative  adjustment  policies on poverty; and
assessing  the sustainability  of various adjustment  packages.35
(a) Completing  the picture
Except for Indonesia  and Malaysia, for which we have detailed household  surveys that cover
the period of adjustment,  we have no systematic  evidence  of the likely trends in poverty and income
distribution  during the adjustment  period. A main advantage  of the simulation  models is that they
provide  a comprehensive  period-by-period  account  of the evolution  nf household  incomes that allows
for inferences  about the likely evolution  of income  distribution  and poverty indicators during
adjustment. 33 In addition, the simulations  are useful for examining  the importance  of shocks and of
the timing of adjustment  measures. We highlight  a few results.
In C6te d'Ivoire, the 1983  drought occurred in the middle of adjustment.  How important  was
the resulting shortfall in agricultural supply, and by how much did it increase  poverty? Lambert,
Schneider, and Suwa simulated  the economywide  effects  of the drought and found that it expanded  the
number  of people in poverty  by more than 15 percent. They also examined  the benefits  of migration
back to rural areas during the crisis for those in the informal sector.
Governments  tend to postpone adjustment  until it can no longer be avoided. What are the
effects of such delays? For Malaysia  - the country  with the most successful  adjustment  program -
Demery and Demery  show that an earlier adjustment  would have smeothed  the intertemporal
distribution  of income, which would have increased  welfare if households  were risk-averse. They
also find that earlier adjustment  would  have led to a slight decrease in the number  of people in
poverty, although  the intensity  of poverty  would have been slightly  higher.  By contrast, Morrisson
finds that in Morocco, substantial  gains would  have occurred from a policy of early adjustment,
which would have reduced  the size of the transfers needed  to stabilize  the income  of the poor. 336
(b) Package  design and poverty
How well did the adjustment  packages  achieve  their goals of efficiency  and equity? To
address  this issue, most authors simulated  the effects of alternative  policies for reducing  the fiscal
income-revenue  gap (government  wage freeze, tax increase, or a different mix of reductions  in
current and capital expenditures),  to see whether  these alternative  policies would  have significantly
altered the outcome in terms of growth, income  distribution, and poverty. We summarize  the main
findings.
In Morocco and Cote d'Ivoire, the need to cut the fiscal deficit  was imperative,  and they tried
to do so primarily  by reducing  real government  salaries and the growth of public sector employment.
Cote d'Ivoire tried to reduce nominal salaries in 1990, but soon abandoned  the attempt. So the
question  for Morocco is whether  this measure  was better than alternative  measures  to reduce global
demand. Morrisson shows that the worst sclution would have been to lay off public employees,  since
that creates unemployment,  reduces growth, and increases  poverty. It turns out that a wage cut is the
only measure  that reduces  inequality  because  public sector employees  are in the middle- and upper-
income  deciles.  The same outcome is also found for CBte  d'Ivoire.  However, Lambert, Schneider
and Suwa are careful to point out that the model-generated  results do not recognize  spillover effects
that would dampen  the magnitude  of estimated  poverty reduction (civil servants probably send a part
of their earnings  to relatives  living in rural areas, who are likely to be poor).  While Morrisson  shows
that no other alternative  expenditure-reduction  package considered  is more favorable  on distributional
grounds than the reduction  in civil servant wages, he finds that cutting operating expenditures  has a
slightly better effect on poverty. Unlike a reduction in public sector wages, a cut in operating
expenditures  does not lead to a fall in demand  for informal sector goods and so, indirectly, to a fall in37
the incomes  of those engaged in the informal  sector.  Morrisson  therefore concludes  that the
Moroccan government chose the right policies. 35
An examination  of the outcomes  of a real exchange  rate devaluation  to switch expenditures
and generate a supply-augmenting  reallocation  of resources also provides some interesting  lessons.
Interpreting  the results from this simulation  is tricky, however. In most simulations, a devaluation  of
the exchange  rate usually alters the country's net external indebtedness,  which implies that one needs
to take into account the effect of a devaluation  on the economy's external  debt position.
For all countries, a devaluation  provides short-term  benefits by stimulating  exports and by
avoiding  the more recessionary  impact  of the alternative  policy of cutting public expenditu:es.'  In
the long run however, results differ across countries. lI  Ecuador, the higher inflation  generated  by
the devaluation  is assumed  to directly  reduce investment  because of the increased  uncertainty.
Growth  is lower as well, and other policies  have a better effect on income distribution  and poverty in
the long run.  In Indonesia,  accelerated  devaluation  results in an acceleration  of inflation and in
capital  flight, but no loss of growth and mixed effects on income distribution  since all income groups,
except large and medium-size  farmers, lose.  In Morocco  devaluation  turns out to be the preferred
instrumem  in terms of social criteria, in the short run, in part because the drop in informal sector
incomes  resulting from the fall in real wages in the modern sector is compensated  for by increased
spending  on informal sector goods by farmers and agricultural  workers, whose real incomes  rise
because  of the devaluation. Morrisson  points out, however, that a policy of successive  devaluations
would quickly  meet with resistance  by modern  sector wage earners.  Furthermore, devaluation
induces a fall in investment  because  of higher real interest rates. Devaluation  also loses its appeal in
Morocco in the longer run because of lower growth.
COte  d'Ivoire is the only country  in our sample that would benefit from a devaluation  both in
the short run and in the long run.  Ironically, it is also the only country  that cannot use this option38
because  it belongs  to the CFA  franc  zone. This  favorable  outcome  is due  mostly  to the devaluation's
growth-inducing  effect  as unemployment  falls  with  higher  export  growth  and external  debt is reduced
because  of the improvement  in the trade  balance. The treasury  also benefits  from the boost  in
revenues  from  the export  stabilization  fund  (even  with  the levy  rate  remaining  constant).37  Poverty
falls  because  unemployment  is lower,  and income  distribution  improves.  Income  inequality  is reduced
because  of the increase  in the cost  of living  for urban  households,  for whom  imports  constitute  a large
share  of consumption,  and  the higher  demand  for the output  of the informal  sector.
Not surprisingly,  most  studies  found  that  devaluation  alone,  without  a cut in expenditure,
would  not have  been  sufficient  to restore  macroeconomic  equilibrium,  even  when  it was  found  to have
short-run  expansionary  effects. The same  conclusion  was  pointed  out  by the analytical  discussion  in
section  2, which  suggested  the need  for joint mu  ietary  and  fiscal  policies  to contain  or reduce
aggregate  demand. Indeed,  while  most  authors  considered  the effects  of devaluation  in isolation  in
their simulations,  when  thc-y  judged  the adequacy  of measures  adopted,  they  considered  policy
packages  in which  devaluation  was  only one  of several  components.  It is nonetheless  interesting  to
contrast  the diversity  of results  from  a policy  of devaluati,  . In general,  a relatively  robust
conclusion  from these  comparisons  is that  devaluation  tends  to reduce  poverty  in rural areas  if small
farmers  produce  export  crops  and  to reduce  inequality  because  the real  incomes  of the rural  poor and
the urban  poor in the informal  sector  fare better  than  those  of the modern  sector  workers. (rhe
incomes  of the poor in the urban  informal  sector  are relatively  less  affected  by the devaluation
because  informal  sector  demand  does  not fall much  as a result  of a devaluation.A)
In Indonesia  and  Malaysia  where  adjustment  was by and large  successful,  the issue  of policy
design  concerned  mainly  whether  the authorities  used  sufficient  fiscal  restraint  or the proper  mix  of
expenditure  reduction  and  whether  increasing  taxation  would  have  been  preferable. For both
countries,  the authors  find that  the alternative  packages  would  not  have  performed  better  than  the39
measures actually  adopted. A larger cut in expenditures  is deflationary,  which is not desirable even
though it improves  the country's external  debt position. For Indonesia,  where highly  disaggregated
data on govermnent  expenditures  is available,  Thorbecke concludes  that a shift in the mix of
government  spending toward public investment  projects might have been marginally  better since the
rural and urban poor would benefit while the rural and urban rich would lose marginally  from such a
shift.9 In Malaysia, a more austere fiscal adjustment  package is also found to be less desirable  than
the course actually  pursued.  Demery and Demery also find that a policy of reducing  the deficit by
raising commodity  and corporate  taxes would  be regressive, since it leads to a drop in household
incomes  and consumption  and a rise in the incidence  of poverty, a result Morrisson also finds for
increased  commodity  taxes in Morocco.
Morrisson finds for Morocco that a more efficient  adjustment  outcome could  have been
achieved  through a public works program that created employment  at low wages for the young and
unskilled, financed  through a cut in government  wages. While the logic and benefits  of such a
program are clear and substantial,  such a policy would probably  have been difficult  to implement
because of resistance  from public servants.
A final issue examined  is the effect of stabilization  policies on the distribution  of income
through portfolio shifts and asset revaluation,  a point also stressed in the paper in this issue by
Bourguignon,  de Melo, and Suwa on modeling  the effects of adjustment. In the Ecuador study,
macroeconomic  disequilibrium  that leads to inflation  and lower investment  also leads to capital flight,
a form of asset protection  available only to the rich.  With capital flight comes  the need for a larger
real exchange  rate devaluation,  which means  a lower real wage and more poverty. These undesirable
distributional  consequences,  a reflection  of a lack of credibility in the adjustment  package, have been
emphasized  in several discussions  of the adjustment  experience  in Latin America (see, for example,40
Diaz-Alejandro  1985). Thus counterfactual  simulations  are helpful in illustrating  the distributional
consequence  of poorly designed  stabilization  policies.
(c)  Sustainable  packages
All too often, it is forgotten  that stabilization  and adjustment  measures  fail because they do
not take into account  the resistance of those whose standard  of living will fall as a result of the
measures. Among our sample countries, lack of support for stabilization  and structural adjustment
policies  that would benefit agroexporters  was particularly  evident in Ecuador, especially  after the
1988  presidential  elections,  when the incumbent,  representing  the interests of agroexporters,  was
ousted by the czndidate  representing  a coalition  of urban interests. Drawing  on the simulations
reported by de lanvry, Sadoulet  and Fargeix, we illustrate  how counterfactual  simulations  can help in
selecting  which policy among  available alternatives  is likely to meet the least political resistance.
Two characteristics  of the Ecuadorian  experience  are typical of the problems  facing many
countries  during adjustment. First, efficient  adjustment  implied  a resource shift toward agriculture,
which evidence  on adjustment  in several countries  in our sample  corroborates  (Morocco, Indonesia,
Chile).  Prima facie evidence  suggests  that such an adjustment  pattern is favorable to the interests  of
agricultural  landowners  at the expense  of urban interests - unless there are compensating  measures
such as food subsidies. Second, adjustment  took place under a fledgling  democratic  regime with
weak institutions  and tenuous political support, a combination  that implies heightened  uncertainty
about the outcome of difficult measures  and an interplay  of political interests  and pressure groups.  In
this context, then, the issue is which adjustment  packages  that are desirable  on economic  efficiency
grounds  are also attractive  in terms of their effects on the distribution  of income. In other words,41
what adjustment  packages  are sustainable  politically,  that is, which packages  will not engender
coalitions  that can bring a halt to adjustment  or a reversal in policies?
The simulations  with the Ecuador model show the most efficient  package in the long run to be
one of fiscal austerity achieved  through reductions  in current expenditures. Packages  that do not
involve  fiscal restraint generate  inflation, which eventually  crowds out private investment. However,
the problem with this adjustment  package, which reduces rural poverty, is that it also reduces the
welfare of all urban groups and is therefore not politically  feasible. An adjustmnent  package that
protects the poor and involves  no loss in real income  during the adjustment  requires a transfer equal
to 3.5 perccnt of GDP (for Morocco, the corresponding  estimate is 1.5 percent of GDP).  Not
surprisingly, de Janvry, Sadoulet,  and Fargeix show that the only politically  feasible option is an
adjustment  package with a foreign aid component  because the next best alternative  - taxing the rich -
would require too large a tax intake from the non-poor  to be politically  feasible.'4
In the absence  of foreign aid, what are the supporting  policies that can make a fiscal austerity
program sustainable  politically? Public campaigns  of information  and persuasion  can help.  Also,
structural reforms that increase  the elasticity  of supply (by raising  the elasticity  of substitution
between capital and labor) both increase growth while reducing  the distributional  shift required to
effect the resource transfer also improve  political sustainability  (see Table 7 de Janvry, Sadoulet, and
Fargeix in this issue).  This is, of course, the aim of microeconomic  reforms in structural adjustment
packages: to raise the efficiency  of resource allocation  while minimizing  distributional  shifts (recall
the comparison  in Figure 3 between rigid and flexible  economies). Policies  that shift public
investment  toward the agroexport  sector are also beneficial  because  such investment  boosts growth in
that sector, thereby reducing rural poverty, and indirectly  improve  conditions  of the urban poor, who
have access to cheaper imports  since less real exchange  rate depreciation  is needed.  Interestingly,  de
Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fargeix point out that the Ecuadorian  government  that represented the interests42
of agroexporters  failed to pursue such a course - the share of government  expenditures  directed to
agriculture  continued  to fall after the election  of Cordero.
The simulations  for Ecuador, however, also point out how little room governments  have to
maneuver  when they must undertake wide-ranging  adjustment  packages, a fact that is known
intuitively  by those who have to implement  the measures  but often overlooked  in academic  discussions
of the social costs of adjustment. What is lacking is an economywide  political-economy  framework
that clearly highlights  the point that distributional  shifts are an unavoidable  component  of adjustment
packages and that a reduction in fiscal expenditures  (when there is no access  to foreign funds to
cushion the impact)  is likely to be unfeasible  if economic  policies are open to interest-group  lobbying.
The other country  studies did not address  the issue of sustainability  as explicitly  as the
Ecuador study, although  the authors usually  alluded to the political consequences  of alternative
adjustment  packages. For example, in comparing  the outcomes  of the various counterfactual
scenarios  with the adjustment  package adopted  by the Indonesian  government  (the base run),
Thorbecke  concluded  that the adjustment  package selected  by the govermnent  was consistent  with
most objectives  Oaid  out by the government). In particular, it sheltered the incomes  of the civil
servants in both the short and long run more than each alternative  counterfactual  simulation  except
one that called for an even greater level of government  current expenditures  than in the base run
scenario. A scenario that emphasizes  public investment  more than in the base run yields the most
favorable policy outcomes  in the long run in terms of higher GDP growth, lower inflation,  and higher
incomes  for most agricultural  household  groups, but these advantages  have to be weighed  against
significantly  lower standards of living for urban and rural higher-income  groups.  Given the political
power of civil servants, Thorbecke concludes  that this cost could not be borne by the government.43
6.  CONCLUSIONS
How the poor fared during the structural  adjustment  programs of the 1980s  has been  - and
continues  to be - the subject  of debate.  Some argue that the poor suffered a great deal and that their
fate depended  on adjustment. Others argue that the decline  in living standards was not so severe  or
pervasive, and that the fate of the poor would have been much worse had adjustment  measures not
been taken.  The purpose of the OECD project was to bring evidence  to the debate by addressing  two
key issues: What happened  to the poor, and what might have happened  to them with adjustment
packages  other than those adopted?
We started with an analytical  discussion  stressing  that adjustment  involved,  among other
things, the need to cope with an adverse external  shock involving  a permanent  loss in the income of
the poor.  Under those circumstances,  the marginal  value of income  to the poor rises, justifying an
income transfer to the poor.  However, because  the initial conditions  characterizing  many economies
on the eve of adjustment  implied  that they were operating well within  their production  frontier, the
possibility  existed of improving  the situation of the poor by successfully  undertaking  growth-
augmenting  structural reforms.  We concluded  that, ultimately,  the issue remains an empirical  matter
that can be resolved  only by recourse to careful analysis  of countries  that carried out adjustment
programs.  Because  of the enormous difficulty  of identifying  the poor and of attributing  changes  in
their well-being  to policies or states  of nature, the OECD project relied on case studies,
complemented  by counterfactual  simulation  analysis.
An interesting  feature of the six country  studies in this symposium  is their diversity.  ';wo of
the countries, Indonesia  and Malaysia,  managed  to adjust without any apparent adverse impact  on the
poor, despite some cuts in social expenditures  in Indonesia. This superior performance  on the
distributional  front was attributed  to a number  of factors, including  relatively  favorable initial44
conditions, early adjustment,  good and credible  policies, and continued  access to external  finance to
smooth adjustment. Not surprisingly,  the exploration  of alternative  adjustment  packages for these two
countries  revealed  only potentially  negligible  improvements  on the distributional  front.
In Chile and Ecuador, unsustainable  macro policies  prior to adjustment  (Chile) or during
adjustment  (Ecuador)  contributed  to a worsening  distribution  of income despite otherwise  sound
structural adjustment  policies. The experience  of these two countries  underscores  the importance  of
adopting credible  policies, since reversals  benefit some segments  of society at the expense  of others.
In Ecuador, capital flight was distributionally  regressive  and in Chile, subsidies  to holders of dollar
debt resulted in a significant  redistribution  of income from the rest of society to the beneficiaries  of
the preferential exchange  rate for dollar liabilities.
Finally, for Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco, urban poverty increased  during adjustment  while
improvement  seems to have occurred in the distribution  of income  as the rural-urban income  gap was
reduced either mostly  as a result of measures  adopted (Morocco)  or mostly as a result of exogenous
events (Cote d'Ivoire).  Simulations  showed  that, for these two countries, alternative  adjustment
packages  would likely have yielded superior outcomes,  particularly  true for C8te d'Ivoire, where
large imbalances  remained.
The centerpiece  of virtually  all adjustment  programs was a sharp devaluation  in real terms.
This devaluation,  which was part of the expenditure-switching  policies  that had to be carried out to
reduce the external  deficit, was also part of the stru.lral  adjustment  policies aimed at improving
resource allocation  and moving the economies  closer to their production frontier.  The evidence  from
the various simulation  exercises  suggests  that this policy instrument  was beneficial  since in the short
run it avoided the recessionary  impact  of adjustment  through fiscal expenditure  cutting. The
simulations  also indicated  that this policy usually  had favorable  short-run effects on the distribution  of
income. When the longer-run  effects of devaluation  including  inflation  and higher real interest rates,45
were taken into account however, the results were more diverse.  For some cases, devaluation
remained superior to the alternative  of contractionary  monetary and fiscal policies, while for others,
the contrary was true.  Interestingly,  the analysis  of alternative  adjustment  instruments  for Cote
d'Ivoire pointed out to the superiority  of devaluation,  an option  not available  to that country. These
conflicting  results point to the need for caution in interpreting  the results of individual  studies, since
authors were often forced to rely on mechanisms  operating during adjustment  whose  validity cannot
be directly tested, or transferred to another setting.
The comparative  studies also show that distributional  conflicts can arise during adjustment.
Among  those, the most prevalent  is the conflict  between agriculture  and labor-intensive  sectors in
manufacturing  on the one hand, and the bureaucratic and import-substituting  sectors on the other.  In
general, agriculture  was found to be sheltered  during adjustment  and to have benefitted  from the
liberalization  measures  and real exchange  rate devaluation  that accompanied  adjustment  programs.
Because  of this conflict  of interests, adjustment  programs must be carefully  managed, especially  in
economies  with large bureaucracies  and import-substituting  sectors.  This suggests  that efficiency
criteria may have to accommodate  distributional  concerns  to avoid excessive  distributional  conflicts.
All too often, it is forgotten that packages  fail because  they do not take into account the
resistance of politically  powerful groups to measures  that reduce their standard  of living.  In Ecuador,
this resistance was at the base of a change in administration  during adjustment. Simulations  suggest
that packages that are most efficient in the long run are not feasible politically  because  they involve
too great a deterioration in the welfare of t ,e political elite in urban areas.  In those cases, timely
foreign aid can make the difference  at relatively  low cost to the donor because  of synergistic  effects
through the induced  growth effects of foreign  aid.  At the same time, insofar as structural reforms do
indeed improve  the flexibility  of the economy, foreign aid can make a difference  by making
adjustment  packages that are desirable on economic  grounds  more feasible politically.46
The discipline  imposed  by general equilibrium  modeling  also shows the narrow room for
maneuvering  when the three criteria of efficiency,  welfare, and political  feasibility are taken into
account. In this setting, all actions  have opportunity  costs beyond those that would be revealed  by a
narrowly focused economic  cost-benefit  calculus. This exposes  the potentially fatal flaws of narrowly
designed adjustment  programs, be they efficiency-focused  or welfare-focused. By the same  token,
because  the margin for maneuver  is so small, unanticipated  adverse shocks  can be devastating  for an
ongoing adjustment  program.  Under those circumstances,  foreign assistance  loans are crucial for
managing  this tenuous balance, with foreign  grants necessary  when the size of the shock is very large.
Nonetheless,  despite these difficulties,  the case studies in this symposium  show that adjustment
programs can be successful.
In the same vein, the research  points out to a great diversity  of impacts of adjustment
programs.  Sharply different distributional  outcomes  can occur with identical  acjustment  packages
when institutional  characteristics  differ widely. Sharply different distributional  outcomes  can also
emerge as a result of changes in the mix between current and capital expenditure  cuts.  This diversity
suggests  the need for careful package design - 'passe partout" adjustment  programs will not do.
Tailoring  adjustment  programs to take into account  the economic  and political environment  is essential
for equity and for the sustainability  of the program itself.  Moreover, the case studies in this
symposium  show that there is no inherent conflict  between  fiscal retrenchment,  which implies a
smaller state, and the balancing  of the objectives  of efficiency, welfare, and political feasibility, which
implies an active state.
The debate on the impact  of adjustment  on the poor is far from being settled.  Yet it is likely
that, as our analysis  of income  distribution  and poverty during adjustment  expands and as reliable
household-level  data become available, our understanding  will increase. We hope that the studies in47
this symposium  shed new light on the debate and point at least a thin beam of light towards some of
the areas where our ignorance is greatest.48
NOTES
1.  Until the crisis of the 1980s,  the economywide  approach  to income  distribution analysis  relied
heavily on the long-run objectives  treated in the influential  work of Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin
(1987).
2.  Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart  (1987) advocate  a combination  of expansionary  macro policies and
targeted micro policies designed  to increase equity  and efficiency. In an IMF study, Heller et al.
(1988)  suggest a descriptive  approach  that relies on a classification  of the poor by meaningful
socioeconomic  groups so as to be able to speculate  on how the poor fared during adjustment.
3.  The country  studies in this symposium  are syntheses  of longer, single-volume  country  studies
published  by the OECD. For a fuller discussion  of each country's experience, the reader is referred
to the volumes referenced  in the foreword to this symposium.
4.  This section  draws on Bourguignon  (1991).
5.  As discussed  below, for economies  inside  their production  possibility  frontier, adjustment  may
not conflict  with poverty alleviation,  if adjustment  also entails moving  closer to the frontier, as would
occur, for example, with effective  structural reforms that improve  resource allocation.
6.  This analysis  neglects  the political-economy  reasons  that make redistributive  policies difficult
to implement  (e.g., interest group coalitions  that oppose the policies). This issue is discussed  in
further detail in section  5 below.
7.  One could, of course, redistribute  current income  at B 2. This would lead to position  B  above
B2 (not shown in the figure). The evidence  suggests  that in economies  with well-functioning  tax and
admimistrative  systems (e.g. the Nordic European  countries), substantial  current income transfers can
be sustained  at low distortionary  costs. In developing  countries,  by and large, static and dynamic costs
of current income transfers are likely to be large.
8.  Evaluating  the outcome of a capital transfer strategy  is likely to be even more complex as it
involves  carrying out a cost-benefit  analysis  of investment  in human capital of the poor.  Since  the
poor are not assumed  to receive any current income  under this strategy, both the poor and non-poor
lose from this strategy in period 1, and the economy  moves to Cl.  As depicted  here, the asset
transfer strategy which leads to C 2, dominates  the current transfer strategy, but is shown to be less
productive  than investment  in the rest of the economy  because  Cl and C 2 lie on ISO-lines  below Al
and Az.  However, once all considerations  are taken into accovant,  including  the difficulty  of
measuring  the economic  efficiency  benefits  resulting  from less social conflict, it is likely that if the
capital  transfer strategy is well implemented,  the economy  could  move to C;, and the equity-efficiency
conflict  suggested  by a capital transfer would then disappear.
9.  For example, the framework  outlined in figure 1 would be useful for analyzing  the tradeoffs
involved  in Malaysia's New Economic  Policy (NEP) of 1975.49
10.  To simplify  the graphical  exposition,  we have assumed  that both economies  face the same
initial real exchange  rate, el.  This is unlikely to be so in practice, though it could  occur as a result of
a combination  of product and factor maiket distortions. As drawn here, we have also assumed  that
nontradables  are a luxury good. This, of course, need not be the case.
11.  To measure the primary and secondary  costs of adjustment  would require drawing budget
lines with slope e. through F and CF. Measured in terms of tradables, the primary (secondary)  costs
would be measured  by the distance on the vertical axis between  the intersection  of the relevant budget
lines with the vertical axis and the budget  line through pF. For more discussion, see Corden (1988).
12.  Labor real income will fall (rise) relative to traded (nontraded)  goods prices.  This
distributional  result was first developed  in Jones (1971).
13.  For an empirical support  on the Stolper-Samuelson  relationship  between  factor intensities  and
the factoral distribution  of income  for a group of developing  countries, see Bourguignon  and
Morrisson (1989, chapter 2).  In particular, they find statistical  support for the hypothesis  that
openness  to foreign trade shifts the factoral  terms of trade toward labor.  This is the case illustrated  in
figures 3 and 4.
14.  For a more complete  discussion  of the properties  of this model, known as the dependent-
economy  model, see for example,  Dornbusch  (1980).
15.  In terms of the models  used in the country studies, the elasticity  of substitution  between
domestic-  and foreign-produced  goods is low, so there is little scope for import substitution  in
response to a real exchange  rate depreciation.
16.  The easiest way to visualize  this is to consider  the model in its dual from, as in Mussa (1978).
17.  Resistance  to cuts in real wages would tend to rotate the factor-price  frontier
counterclockwise  while resistance  to cuts in profits would rotate it clockwise. However, one cannot
ascertain a priori how the factor price frontier will behave  because it would depend  on the exact
origin of the price rigidity. Furthermore, in practice, it remains  an open question  which group will
have the upper-hand  when both engage ir resistance to cuts in living standards. The structuralist
literature addresses this issue at length (see, e.g., Taylor 1987).
18.  See Table 6 in Meller's discussion  in section  4 below.
19.  For a full description  of the model, see the article by Bourguignon,  de Melo, and Suwa in this
issue.
20.  Given Indonesia's strong  performance  during adjustment  (see table 2), it is unlikely that it had
rigid demand and supplyi  structures. Or, if that was the case prior to adjustment,  structural reforms
were successful in eliminating  bottlenecks. Chile would also fall in that category if it were not for the
major reforms of the late 1970s,  which transformed  if into an economy  with no institutional  rigidities
except for wage indexation  in the formal sector, which was abandoned  in 1982 in the depth of the
crisis.
21.  Chile, in spite of falling copper  prices, also had a period of euphoria when it benefited  from
large capital inflows  in 198-81.so
22.  In Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco, the amount  of food marketed  by the poor is quite small, so
this effect is not likely to be very significant.
23.  Because  of the fixed exchange  rate, increased  competitiveness  was achieved  by the involuntary
appreciation  of the dollar and by the voluntary  depreciation  of the French franc against  other EMS
currencies in 1981, 1982 and 1983, and, later in the adjustment,  by the combination  of a tariff
surcharge  and export subsidies. In Cote d'Ivoire, little increase in competitiveness  was achieved
indirectly.
24.  For an assessment  of recent tax reforms, including  those for Indonesia  and Morocco, see
Thirsk (1990).
25.  Definitions  of country groupings  are given in table 1. A fairly similar pattern of results
obtains  with groupings  defined by income levels. Note, however, that all the data in table 2 are from
the World Bank.  While internally  consistent  to the extent possible, the period averages in table 2
might deviate slightly  from those that would  be obtained from the data in the country studies.
26.  See the article by Meller in this issue (table 4) for a decomposition  of the primary and
secondary  costs of adjustment  in terms of tradable  and nontradable  sectors.  It should be noted that
Chile had widespread  wage indexation  in the formal labor market which contributed  to inflexibility.
27.  In fact, Morocco tried to stabilize attempts  in 1978  ard  1980,  but govermment  attempts  to cut
food subsidies, led to riots and to the abandonment  of the measures. See the article by Morrisson in
this issue for further discussion.
28.  Both countries  are among  a group of 18 highly indebted  countries.
29.  In terms of figure 2, these supply-augmenting  structural reforms moved both countries closer
to their respective  production  possibility  frontiers.
30.  Eventually  Indonesia  received adjustmnent  loans from the World Bank (starting in 1987, but
by then, most adjustment  measures  had already been adopted.
31.  With the election  of Cordero in 1984, political power shifted  back toward the traditional  elite,
agroexporters  and bankers
32.  Industrial  employment  fell at an average annual rate of 2 percent during 1981-85. See the
article by de Janvry, Sadoulet,  and Fargeix  in this issue (table 2).  They note that fiscal also austerity
reduced employment  opportunities  for skilled and unskilled  labor.
33.  It is particularly encouraging  that the base run of the Malaysia  model tracked very closely the
observed changes  in the distribution  of income  during adjustment. See the article by Demery and
Demery in this issue (section  6).
34.  Morrisson simulates  earlier adjustment  with a package that includes  a freeze on the minim'zm
wage. While such a policy is likely to be more acceptable  when applied early on, it would still
probably meet with resistance.51
35.  Considering  that a similar policy had to be abandoned  when it was applied in C6te d'Ivoire in
1990, and in light of the discussion  below on the political  sustainability  of adjustment  packages, one
cannot  but help but wonder whether  this policy  could be implemented  in a less authoritarian  regime
than Morocco's.
36.  We do not report on the devaluation  experiments  for Malaysia  since devaluation  is also
accompanied  by less fiscal restraint. It turns out that this package has a slightly negative  effect on the
balance  of payments, probably  because  devaluation  is accompanied  by a less restrictive fiscal policy.
The package also results in slightly higher  growth than in the base run.
37.  It is interestmg  to contrast  this outcome  with the more direct alternative  of raising export
taxes. Lambert, Schneider  and Suwa show that raising export taxes generates significant  indirect
effects, which dampen the initial fiscal improvement.
38.  The controversy  on the effects of devaluation  on output (and even more so on income
distribution  ) is far from settled. For a recent survey of the theoretical  debate see Lizondo and
Montiel  (1989). For empirical  results, see Edwards (1989). It should therefore not be surprising  that
country  studies find different results.
39.  In the Ecuadorian  case, adjustment  through a cut in current expenditures  is also found to be
preferable  to that through a cut in capital expenditures  on distributional  and efficiency  grounds. This
is because  a cut in capital expenditures  reduces  the real incomes  of unskilled  workers whereas a cut in
current expenditures  results in a cut in living standards  for skilled workers.  See the article in this
issue by de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fargeix (figure 1).
40.  Interestingly,  the simulations  show that th3 amnount  of foreign aid required is only about two-
thirds of the required transfer because  of the growth-inducing  effects of foreign aid (see de Janvry,
Sadoulet,  and Fargeix (sectionl  Sb). This result, which implies  that timely aid can make the difference
between a sustainable  adjustment  package and one that fails, is often overlooked. In the Ecuadorian
case, timely  debt relief did not follow the earthquake  in March 1987.52
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